Spinning Bulletproof Fiber
The AUSA conference is like a G.I. Joe cartoon bursting to life.
From a tethered VTOL drone that launches off the back of Humvees to night vision goggles that provide an enemy’s precise GPS location, shiny hi-tech military systems abound at AUSA.
But even the seemingly basic equipment on display is quite complex — and this makes for an interesting PR situation.
I’m thinking about personal armor, in particular. There are no switches, moving motors and electrical interfaces in a bulletproof vest, yet turning out a final product requires many different hands.
At one booth, a marketing manager showed me swatches of specially treated polyethylene fiber. The fiber, he explained, ended up in the helmets and the armor plates fashioned by other companies.
But that wasn’t all. His company also produced another type of bulletproof material that incorporated the aramid fiber Kevlar, produced by Du Pont.
As I walked away, I marveled at the complexity of the bulletproofing process and wondered who would be held responsible if a vest failed to stop, say, a .44 Magnum.
How would one handle the negative PR fallout?
Unfortunately, this is no abstract question. In 2003, one police officer was killed and another wounded when their bulletproof vests, sold by the now-defunct Second Chance firm, failed.
What then followed was a back-and-forth of evasive communiqués.
Second Chance was quick to blame the synthetic fiber Zylon in their vests for the tragic incidents. The material, company officials said, degraded too quickly when exposed to heat and moisture.
Not to be chastened, the Japanese supplier of Zylon pointed the finger back at Second Chance.
The Japanese claimed that no other armor client had a problem with Zylon, so clearly, Second Chance must have employed the material incorrectly.
Another company, Armor Holdings, then joined the fray and claimed that its Zylon material was just fine. However, a Justice Department study in 2005 found the fiber to be defective, and as a result, the company decided to discontinue its product line.
In 2007, Armor Holdings was bought by BAE.
During the whole sordid controversy (which included a whistleblower from Second Chance, who claimed that the company suspected Zylon defects two years before the police shootings, and damning internal documents from the Japanese firm), none of the parties really stepped forward to take responsibility.
It was an utter failure in crisis management.
Had Second Chance been my client, I would have suggested that, instead of discussing Zylon behind closed doors, armor company officials take public steps to address the degradation issue. Had they done so in 2001, they wouldn’t have had a far more serious crisis two years later.
That said, following the 2003 vest failures, I would have recommended the following actions:
- Get the CEO out front taking the lead.
- Don’t dismiss the problem as only two defective vests.
- Meet the families, listen to them.
- Contact police departments to discuss Zylon.
- Offer to replace older (and therefore, likely worn-out) police vests.
- Replace these vests with ones using a different bulletproof fabric.
- Don’t point fingers at others.
- Invite the Japanese Zylon provider to participate in a joint investigation.
- Prepare for a critical press reception.
Would these steps have made everything go away? No. Even if Second Chance had done everything right, there still would have been economic and reputational damage — at least in the short-to-medium term.
But in the long term, being forthright would have been a much better approach than ping-ponging the blame between the fiber spinners and armor designers.
A former defense tech and security affairs journalist, Schechter is an account supervisor at Spector & Associates. Previous experience includes time spent at the White House, Center for Strategic and International Studies, IDF Armored Corps and Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. He can be reached at Erik@SpectorPR.com
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